Why Approval Voting Should be Approved Now

In Approval voting, each voter simply votes for, or ``approves,'' as many of the candidates as desired (without ranking them). As in plurality voting, the votes are counted, and the candidate with the most votes wins. No new voting equipment is needed. The ballots don't even need to be changed. Moreover, the change to the current voting rules is trivial: ``vote for one'' simply becomes ``vote for one or more.''

Although trivial to implement, Approval voting goes a long way toward overcoming the ``lesser of two evils'' problem inherent in our current voting system, which artificially entrenches our political system into a two-party duopoly without effective competition from other parties. And although Approval voting is much simpler than Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), it is actually more effective according to important technical criteria, with no significant disadvantages compared to IRV.

Critics of Approval voting point out that it does not allow voters to specify preferences among their selected candidates. But the option to specify preferences is of dubious value if those preferences are not reliably counted. In Condorcet voting all preferences are systematically counted, but in IRV they are not. Depending on how the chips fall, the uncounted preferences in IRV can be the most important preferences expressed by the voters. Approval voting essentially allows voters to decide for themselves which of their preferences are important enough to be counted. Hence, although Approval voting is not as effective as Condorcet voting, we believe it is actually more effective than IRV.

Consider voting strategy in an Approval system. Suppose Approval voting has just been adopted in the United States. Voters who prefer a minor party, such as the Libertarian or Green Party, will vote for that party in addition to their usual ``lesser of two evils'' choice between the Democrat and the Republican. Many Greens, for example, will vote for both the Green and Democratic candidates, while many Libertarians will vote for the Libertarian and the Republican. The voters who actually prefer the Democrat or the Republican, on the other hand, will vote only for the one they prefer.

The important point is that supporters of minor parties will be free to vote for their preferred candidate without concern that their vote will backfire and hurt their own cause, as can happen under plurality or IRV if they vote sincerely. The true level of support for minor parties will therefore become apparent. If that level of support ever exceeds the support of the major party they consider the ``greater evil,'' then the supporters of the minor party can quit voting for the compromise major party they consider the ``lesser evil.''

If Libertarians start outpolling Democrats, for example, they can quit voting for Republicans as a hedge against Democrats. Eventually, they will have a fair chance to actually win. Note, however, that Libertarians could inadvertently let the Democrats win if they pull back too soon on their support for Republicans, and the decision about when to do so could be difficult. That is one reason why Approval voting, although preferable to plurality voting and IRV, is still not as effective as Condorcet voting.

Approval voting gives voters no incentive to abandon their favorite candidate or insincerely rank another candidate over their favorite. Our current plurality system, on the other hand, essentially forces many voters to betray their favorite candidate, and experience with IRV in Australia shows that it encourages voters to insincerely rank their preferred major-party candidate over their true favorite. Under plurality and IRV, voting for your favorite can backfire and cause the election of a candidate you strongly disapprove. Under Approval voting, however, you can always vote for your favorite candidate without helping any candidate you disapprove.

With a trivial change in current voting rules, and with no new voting equipment or even new ballots, Approval voting can correct a major defect of plurality voting, giving minor parties a much fairer chance. It is not as effective as Condorcet voting, but it is more effective than either conventional plurality voting or IRV. Approval voting should therefore be approved now.

References

Approval Voting and the Good Society by Steven J. Brams, Political Economy of the Good Society, newsletter 3, no. 1, Winter 1993: 10-14.